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Abstract
A sufficient condition for the discounted Folk Theorem is that for every
individually rational payoff vector u, there exists another individually rational
payoff vector v such that v < u. We present an example of a full dimensional
game where this property fails to be satisfied. Furthermore, we present a simple
and direct proof that full dimensionality implies a weaker, but still sufficient
property for the discounted Folk Theorem.
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1 Introduction
The discounted Folk Theorem states that, under some appropriate condition, every
individual rational payoff vector of a normal-form game can be supported by a sub-
game perfect equilibrium strategy of the discounted repeated games it induces.
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The most widely used sufficient condition for the discounted Folk Theorem was
introduced by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and requires the set of individually
rational payoffs to be full dimensional. A close reading of the proof of Fudenberg-
Maskin’s Theorem 2 reveals, however, that all one needs to establish it is to be able to
slightly perturb the payoff we want to support inside the set of individually rational
payoffs.
Two types of perturbations have, in fact, been considered in that proof: the first,
which we shall refer to as the strong Fudenberg-Maskin property, requires that for
every individually rational payoff u there exists another individually rational payoff
v satisfying v < u. The second, which we name the Fudenberg-Maskin property,
requires only that for every individually rational payoff u there exist individually
rational payoff vectors {u(1), . . . , u(n)}, one for every player i = 1, . . . , n, satisfying
u
(i)
i < ui for all i and the payoff asymmetry condition in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith
(1994).
The main goal of this note is to present an example showing that the full di-
mensionality assumption does not imply the strong Fudenberg-Maskin property. Our
example confirms the intuition expressed in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994, Footnote
7) that the construction required by the strong Fudenberg-Maskin property may not
be possible whenever the payoff u lies on the lower boundary of the set of individually
rational payoffs.
A second goal of this note is to provide a direct proof of the fact that the full
dimensionality assumption implies the Fudenberg-Maskin property. Although this
result can be established using the methods of Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) (which
also have the advantage of reaching the same conclusion with a weaker condition),
the proof presented here has some interest by being simpler, shorter, and of course,
by linking directly the full dimensionality assumption and the Fudenberg-Maskin
property.
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2 Notation and Definitions
As in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), we consider a n-person game g : A1×· · ·×An →
Rn. For convenience, let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players, A = A1× · · · ×An
denote the joint action space and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAj.
For all i ∈ N , the minmax payoff for player i is
v∗i = min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, a−i)
and let M i be a minmax strategy against player i, i.e.,
M i ∈ arg min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, a−i).
The vector v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) is the minmax point, and we normalize the payoffs of
the game g so that v∗ = 0. Let V = co (g(A)) denote the set of feasible payoffs and
V ∗ = {v ∈ V : vi > 0 for all i ∈ N} denote the set of individually rational payoffs.
A game g has the strong Fudenberg-Maskin property if for all u ∈ V ∗ there exists
v ∈ int(V ∗) such that v < u. A game g has the Fudenberg-Maskin property if for all
u ∈ V ∗ and i ∈ N there exists u(i) ∈ V ∗ satisfying: u(i)i < ui and u(i)i < u(j)i for all
i, j ∈ N with j 6= i. As was shown by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) in the course of
the proof of their Theorem 2, if u ∈ V ∗ has the strong FM property, then u has the
Fudenberg-Maskin property.
We shall use the following standard notation: {e1, . . . , en} denotes the standard
basis of Rn, for all u ∈ Rn, ||u|| denotes the sup norm of u, and for all ε > 0 and
x ∈ R, Bε(x) denotes the open ball of radius ε around x.
3 Full Dimensionality and the Fudenberg-Maskin
Property
Since V ∗ is a convex subset of Rn, we can meaningfully speak of its dimension (see
Rockafellar (1970, p. 12)). In general, let C be a nonempty convex subset of Rm.
The affine hull, aff(C), of C is the smallest affine set containing S.1 By Rockafellar
1Recall that a subsetM of Rm is an affine set if (1−λ)x+λy ∈M for every x, y ∈M and λ ∈ R.
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(1970, Theorem 1.2), each nonempty affine set is parallel to a unique subspace, i.e.,
there exists a ∈ Rm and a unique subspace L of Rm such that M = L+ a. Then, the
dimension, dim(C), of C is the dimension of the subspace parallel to its affine hull.
A convex subset C of Rm is full dimensional if dim(C) = m. Note that this
condition holds if and only if int(C) is nonempty. In fact, the only if part follows from
Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 6.2, p.45), while the if part can be established as follows:
if x ∈ int(C) and ε > 0 is such that B2ε(x) ⊆ C, then {x, x+εe1, . . . , x+εem} ⊆ C is
affinely independent, and so aff({x, x+ εe1, . . . , x+ εem}) is full dimensional. Hence,
dim(C) = dim(aff(C)) = m.
The following example shows that a game may fail to have the strong Fudenberg-
Maskin property even if V ∗ is full dimensional.
Consider the following three-player game where player 1 chooses a row (a or b),
player 2 a column (A or B) and player 3 a matrix (α or β). If player 3 chooses α,
then payoffs are:
A B
a (0,1,0) (1,0,0)
b (0,1,0) (1,0,0)
while if player 3 chooses β, payoffs are:
A B
a (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
b (1,1,0) (1,0,0)
Note that player 1 receives 0 if the others play (A,α), player 2 receives 0 if the
others play (a, β) and player 3 receives 0 if the others play (b, B). Hence v∗i = 0 for
all i = 1, 2, 3.
The equivalence between the full dimensionality of V ∗ and the nonemptiness of
its interior imply easily that if V˘ = {v ∈ V : vi ≥ 0} is full dimensional, then so is
V ∗ since int(V˘ ) = int(V ∗).
Hence, in order to prove that V ∗ is full dimensional, it is enough to show that
dim(V˘ ) = 3, which is equivalent to aff(V˘ ) = R3. Letting c1 = (1, 0, 0) = e1, c2 =
4
(0, 1, 0) = e2, c3 = (0, 0, 1) = e3 and c4 = (1, 1, 0), then
aff(V˘ ) =
{
4∑
j=1
λjcj :
4∑
j=1
λj = 1
}
=
{
(λ1 + λ4, λ2 + λ4, λ3) :
4∑
j=1
λj = 1
}
= {(1− λ2 − λ3, 1− λ1 − λ3, λ3) : λ1, λ2, λ3 ∈ R}.
Hence, if x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3, then by defining λ1 = 1− x2 − x3, λ2 = 1− x1 − x3,
λ3 = x3 and λ4 = 1 −
∑3
j=1 λj, it follows that x =
∑4
j=1 λjcj ∈ aff(V˘ ). Thus,
aff(V˘ ) = R3.
Note that, for all u ∈ V ∗ ⊆ V = co(g(A)), we have that u = ∑4j=1 θjcj for some
{θj}4j=1 such that θj ≥ 0 for all j and
∑
j θj = 1. Hence,
∑3
i=1 ui = 1 + θ4 ≥ 1.
Consider u = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) ∈ V ∗. Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction,
that there exists v ∈ int(V ∗) such that v < u. Then, ∑3i=1 vi < 1. However, since
v ∈ V ∗, then it follows by the above that ∑3i=1 vi ≥ 1, a clear contradiction. Thus,
this game does not satisfy the strong Fudenberg-Maskin property.
Although the full dimensionality of V ∗ does not imply the strong Fudenberg-
Maskin property, it suffices to establish the Fudenberg-Maskin property.
Theorem 1 If dim(V ∗) = n, then g has the Fudenberg-Maskin property.
Proof. Let u ∈ V ∗. Since dim(V ∗) = n, then int(V ∗) is nonempty and so let
u0 ∈ int(V ∗). For all i ∈ N , define
u˜(i) = λ(θu+ (1− θ)g(M i)) + (1− λ)u0,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen sufficiently close to 1 so that θu + (1− θ)g(M i) ∈ V ∗ and
λ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen sufficiently close to 1 so that u˜(i)i < ui (note that the payoff for
player i in θu+ (1− θ)g(M i) is equal to θui < ui). Since θu+ (1− θ)g(M i) belongs
to V ∗, u0 ∈ int(V ∗) and λ ∈ (0, 1), it follows from Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 6.1, p.
45) that u˜(i) ∈ int(V ∗). Let ε > 0 be such that B2ε(u˜(i)) ⊆ V ∗ for all i ∈ N .
Let i ∈ N and let k(i) ∈ N be such that u˜(k(i))i ≤ u˜(l)i for all l ∈ N . Then, define
u(i) = u˜(k(i)) − εei.
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Since ||u(i) − u˜(k(i))|| = ε, it follows that u(i) ∈ V ∗ for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, we
have that u
(i)
i < ui for all i ∈ N . Indeed, u(i)i = u˜(k(i))i − ε ≤ u˜(i)i − ε < ui. Finally, we
claim that u
(i)
i < u
(j)
i for all i, j ∈ N such that j 6= i. Indeed,
u
(i)
i = u˜
(k(i))
i − ε ≤ u˜(k(j))i − ε = u(j)i − ε < u(j)i .
Hence, u satisfies the Fudenberg-Maskin property.
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